Many governments have tried to develop a liability and compliance law that can improve cyber security in a sustainable way. This paper explores whether a liability and compliance law is effective in motivating firms' information security activities. In particular, I empirically investigate the impact of the 2007 Electronic Financial Transaction Act (EFTA), a liability and compliance law in Korea, on the information security activities of financial institutions and services providers. In spite of various criticisms of the effectiveness of EFTA, the empirical findings of this study clearly show that EFTA is having a positive impact on information security activities. From these findings, this article concludes that a liability and compliance law is likely to contribute to a certain degree to the achievement of sustainable development of cyber security.
Introduction
Dramatically increased cyber-attacks led by highly organized cyber perpetrators have resulted in a need for more effective and sustainable security measures and strategies to respond effectively to these attacks. Accordingly, in order to achieve sustainable development of cyber-security, many developed and developing countries have enacted cyber security laws which enforce compliance with higher security standards in certain information technology (IT) related activities [17] . For example, in the U. S., the Gramm-LeachBliley Act's security regulation and the HIPAA security regulation, which require certain types of firms such as financial institutions to employ sustainable security management standards, were issued in 2001 and 2003, respectively [17] . In addition, several countries began to impose stricter liability rules on firms particularly with databases of financial and credit information as well as private information. In Korea, a proactive country in terms of cyber-security, the e-Financial Transaction Act (hereinafter referred to as EFTA) was enacted in 2007. This act tried to foster a sustainable information security infrastructure by prescribing higher legal standards for financial institutions and service providers, and imposing responsibilities for lossescaused by cyber financial accidents.
While one can witness the evolution of national compliance and liability regulations as a response to the needs for sustainable development of cyber-security, there has been considerable debate over whether these regulations are effective in promoting firms' cyber security activities. According to Schneier [23] and Varian [26] , for example, poor information security in business practice is mainly caused by ill-distributed liability and compliance, and can be fixed by assigning the liability to the party that is in the best position to manage security risks. More specifically, Schneier [23] argues that the key element for security improvement is liability, and therefore, liable parties are motivated to put forth their best efforts to protect their security. In a similar vein, Varian [26] also argues that, in the case of the U. K. and the U. S., organizations with security liability have an incentive to invest in information security with due care and attention. In contrast, however, other researchers claim that security liability and compliance might not result in effective enforcement. Hoo [11] for instance, argues that even if compliance and liability rules are in effect, firms would not increase information security activities if the net payoff from the increase in information security activities is lower than the losses from cyber incidents, including legal fees from an ensuing liability lawsuit, regulatory violation penalties and lost earnings due to a diminished reputation. Johnson [12] In such cases, imposing compliance and liability regulations might be ineffective and impractical. Whether or not a liability Act is effective for increasing firms'information security activities and can help achieve sustainable development of information security is therefore an empirical issue.
With one notable exception [10] , there has been only limited research which focuses on empirical investigation on the impact of a compliance and liability regulation on firms' information security activities. Gordon et al.
in reference [10] provide indirect evidence that security activities are drawing more attention from organizations since the passage of a compliance law than before it was enacted. This study builds on and expands reference [10] by empirically exploring the impact of a compliance and liability regulation on firms' information security activities in the case of Korea. More explicitly, the primary objective of this study is to investigate direct empirical evidence on the impact of EFTA, a Korean compliance and liability law targeting financial institutions and service providers, on firms' information security activities (i.e., the changes in firms' information security activities before and after the passage of EFTA) and to identify whether EFTA helps to create a sustainable national system for cyber security. I proceed with this investigation using the 2007 and 2008 Korean Information Security Surveys published by the Korean Internet and Security Agency (KISA) [13, 14] . As will be seen, the empirical results indicate that EFTA is generating a positive impact on financial institutions and service providers' information security activities: financial institutions and service providers significantly increased information security related activities after the enactment of EFTA. The findings from this analysis, therefore, provide strong evidence that EFTA is helping build an effective and sustainable national system of cyber-security.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, the background of EFTA and the basic provisions of the Act will be summarized in order to set the stage for an empirical assessment of the effect of the act on information security activities by firms.
In Section 3, the study turns to a discussion of the main research hypothesis, research method and its results. Section 4 concludes the study with a discussion of our empirical findings and their implications.
Background
As is the case with other developed coun- 
Empirical Study

Sample
In order to measure the impact of EFTA 
Variables
Our dependent variable is an organization's security activities. An organization's security activities can be measured in many ways.
Tanaka et al. [25] , for example, used a binary choice variable (use or no use of the information security policy) to measure an organization's security activities. According to the authors, they employed this measure because it is extremely difficult to measure security activities directly, which are related to many different security controls including security software and hardware. Liu et al. [16] used the number of security measures as a proxy of security activities. In their study, rather than using the real number of security measures employed, the authors categorized security activity levels into two groups : a group with a low security activity (i.e., the number of security measures is four and below) and a group with a high security activity (i.e., the number of security measures is seven and above).
In this study, I use the percentage of the total IT budgets allocated to information security, sec_inv_rate, as a proxy for a firm's information security activities (hereinafter referred to as "information security investment rate") [6] : this measure can be defined as the relative percentage of a firm's total IT budget which is given to the firm's activities on in- [2, 7-9, 21, 22] . The KISA surveys categorize the information security investment rate into seven categories : 0%, 0～less than 1%, 1～less than 3%, 3～less than 5%, 5～less than 7%, 7～less than 10% and 10% or more. I assign 1 through 7 to each category, respectively. Figure 1 shows the information security investment rate of respondent firms.
The independent variables can be cate- 
Analysis
To test the hypothesis of the impact of I therefore estimate the difference-in-differences estimator which has the following specification :
where "" stands for "a firm in the financial and insurance industry" and "" stands for "a firm not in the financial and insurance industry"; and "" stands for "in the Post- Like the previous result, the coefficient on the interaction term shows that firms in the financial and insurance industry invested more in information security after the enactment of EFTA than did firms in other industries, and thus I reject the null hypothesis. It should be noted that, in this model,  has a small- where logtel is a binary variable equal to one if the firm is in the logistics and telecommunications industry and zero otherwise, and realtor is a binary variable equal to one if the firm is in the real estate, renting and business activities industry.   and   are the interaction terms of the year dummy variable, and the 'logistics and telecommunications' and 'real estate, renting and business services' industry dummy variables, respectively.
The estimates of Equation (a.1) are given in <Table a.1> It can be identified that the variables   and   are not statistically significant, suggesting that information security activities of firms in the logistics and telecommunication industry and in the real estate, renting and business services industry in the Post-EFTA year do not show the systematic difference with the activities in the Pre-EFTA year. <Table a.2>, which includes the additional control variables, also shows the similar result. These results suggest strong indirect evidence that the increased activities of information security in the financial and insurance industry is caused by the enactment of EFTA rather than other reasons. 
